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COMMUNIST THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY IN EVENT OF SOVIET SURPRISE ATTACK

The following estimate has been made by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference composed of the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; G-2, Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; and Office of Special Investigations, Air Force.

A. Groups and Individuals Available for Soviet Subversive Purposes

To aid in its attempts to disrupt and frustrate our defensive and counter-offensive efforts in the circumstances of a surprise attack, the U.S.S.R. has a very formidable ally within our own camp: the Communist Party, USA. The members of that organization, now estimated at 37,000, by virtue of their total devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the Soviet "fatherland," are committed to defend the U.S.S.R. "unswervingly," with all means at their disposal and at any price.

Other potential sources upon which the U.S.S.R. may draw (or from which it may obtain spontaneous aid) are Communist sympathizers, Communist front organizations, some Trotskyites, anti-U.S. nationalistic groups, and persons otherwise disaffected. Additional potential sources of manpower for aid in subversive purposes are members of Soviet and Satellite diplomatic, consular, commercial, industrial, press, academic and "cultural" establishments and missions, and UN personnel.

Although the Communist Party, USA is well known for its highly-developed "monolithic" organizational apparatus, and for its Bolshevik "iron discipline," the recent arrests of top leaders, and the forced hiding of others, have unquestionably caused some disruption in the previously smooth-running Party machine. Further arrests may be expected to cause additional damage to that apparatus and to its subversive potential. However, while it is realized that such action limits that potential, it still remains a threat with which to reckon.

B. Communist Organizational Tactics in the Present Period

The Communist Party, USA has always conducted some of its activities on an underground basis, but since 1947, that basis has been enlarged considerably through the taking of elaborate "security measures" designed to provide additional cover for its activities. Now, since the indictment of the National Board members (July 17, 1948), and especially since the Supreme Court decision (June 4, 1951) upholding the conviction of the 11 National Board members, the Party

FBI REVIEW COMPLETED

ARMY, USAF and NAVY review(s) completed.

has gone even farther underground. A Soviet surprise attack would surely complete the "descent."

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that Communists have no desire to go (or remain) wholly underground, except as a last resort; they find such a condition stifling and stagnating. They deem continued contact with "the masses" to be essential even in the face of what they call "a reactionary drive to destroy our Party." Their Leninist principles call for an orderly retreat to regroup their forces for a later offensive. They are mindful of what their Soviet masters declare to be "the most important rule of Bolshevik tactics in periods of retreat, namely, to combine illegal with legal work within the various legally existing workers' societies and unions. . ." Thus, their organizational and tactical principles proper to this situation call for a combination of:

- 1) underground ("illegal") operation, to preserve the Party from destruction, and
- 2) aboveground ("legal") activity, carried on through fronts and infiltrated organizations and institutions of all types, with a view to endeavoring to influence "the masses" along Communist lines.

Accordingly, it may be expected that in the future -- prior to a surprise attack and also in the event one takes place -- Communist activity will be directed toward more than mere self-preservation. The Party will continue to attempt to carry out its general task of intensifying the class struggle during this, the "eve of the proletarian revolution." Furthermore, these attempts to accomplish Communist purposes may be more difficult to detect and to frustrate than in the past, because of their increased subtlety and heavier disguise. The wire from the charge to the detonator will be longer, more tenuous, and more deeply buried than before. . .

C. Communist Action to be Anticipated in Event of Soviet Surprise Attack

In the event of a surprise attack, the Communist Apparatus may be expected to make coordinated attempts immediately to destroy:

- 1) our will to resist, and
- 2) our means of resisting.

Psychological warfare directed toward the destruction of our will to resist (or toward causing fatal hesitation or confusion in repelling the attack and launching the counter-offensive) might take the form of widespread circulation (effected, e.g., through newspapers with "forged" mastheads and titles, broadcasts over seized radio stations, etc.) of false reports and rumors concerning: the strength and initial successes of the enemy; the destruction and/or capture of important cities; the slaughter of millions of military and civilian citizens by means of both powerful and insidious weapons; the surrender of important units of our Armed Forces; the existence of total confusion among our military and Government leaders; and the unmasking (forced or spontaneous) of Communists in high military and Government posts. Such efforts, if successful, might cause seriously disruptive civil disturbances, such as race riots, a revolutionary situation on the home front, and a lowering of military and civilian morale. To destroy our means of resisting the attack, Communists may be expected to attempt the sabotage of our vital installations and industries. Our highly complex mode of production, with its heavily interdependent operations, offers many opportunities for causing the partial and temporary paralysis of the whole. The long-standing Communist "concentration policy" -- the recruitment (and placement) of members in basic and key industries, particularly "the heavy industries and those of a war character" -- has contributed to Communist capabilities with respect to sabotage. Not all Communist sabotage attempts will be directed, of course, toward open, physical destruction. They are well aware that serious damage can be effected over a long period by fomenting labor disputes over real or alleged grievances, and by carrying out a slow-down maneuver under the guise of a fight against "speed-up." (Communist Party members are now being instructed that although it is desirable that they support by agitation the grievances of workers in industrial plants, the members themselves must be kept in the background in such agitation.)

Counter-acting the Communist threat, the campaign waged by many major labor unions to expel Communists from their ranks has contributed to the limitation of the Party's sabotage potential. In addition, increased public enlightenment concerning the Communist threat to our security has undoubtedly resulted in greater vigilance on the part of American workers with respect to the cunning tactics of their Communist fellow-employees.

#### D. Protective Measures

Being well aware of the grave threat to our internal security which the Communist Party, USA and related forces constitute, Federal intelligence agencies have taken extensive measures to limit,

and if possible, destroy the destructive potential of that Party. The most important of these measures are the following:

- 1) The arrest and prosecution of top leaders of the Party.
- 2) An apprehension and detention program based on constant investigation to identify those persons whose activities indicate they are a potential danger to the internal security, and who should be immediately "immobilized" in a time of emergency.
- 3) Investigation of the character, loyalty, and associations of Atomic Energy Commission applicants and employees, and of all persons having access to restricted AEC data.
- 4) Facilitating the protection of resources, premises, utilities and industrial facilities essential to support a war-time industrial mobilization program, through furnishing of information to appropriate authorities concerning subversive activities, investigation of individuals having access to highly classified information, investigation of possible sabotage, furnishing of technical advice, and assistance in formulating policies, standards and procedures for protective measures.
- 5) Development of informants in basic and in vital industries and facilities with a view to identifying those persons who are a potential danger to the security of those establishments.
- 6) Constant, vigorous investigation of subversive groups, and of fronts and "covers" under which Communists may seek refuge and from which they may attempt to continue their "legal," aboveground activities.
- 7) Measures to insure security and loyalty of government employees, military and civilian, including investigations under the Loyalty of Government Employees Program set out in Executive Order 9835.
- 8) The coordination and free exchange of information among all Federal agencies concerning matters of mutual interest.